

Anti-bribery control and incentives as agency theory approaches

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Abstract

This article takes an agency theory approach towards bribery in multinational corporations. In particular, it is advocated that incentives could help to align the interests of principals and agents and reduce information asymmetries. This could help to increase anti-bribery compliance and hence support the fight against corruption in Eastern Europe.

Keywords: Bribery, Corruption, Agency Theory, Compliance.

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