

Kosovo, the beginning and end of the adventure of a dictator in Europe

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Abstract

When desires are not based in reality, the result is the only one that can be expected from such desires. In such games winning is actually called losing. That also happened with the consuming desires of the late dictator in Europe, Milošević. The permanent Yugoslav president Tito, was known for his philosophy: *"We decline what is not ours; ours we will relinquish not"*.

Although it was not like that, this philosophy had its success. It kept the morale of strength and the existence of a state of over 30 nations who lived in it and who remained steadfast and unbeaten throughout the Cold War. With Tito's death his country died too, altogether with the philosophy.

The fact that it really was just philosophy was shown several years later, when in the absence of a successor to Tito, but also through new anticommunist movements in the world, the state collapsed becoming involved in war and chaos that was manifested by bloody tragedies of very large dimensions. Of course all this tragedy was preceded by Serbian chauvinist passions and desires which were planned for a century in all forms, and which were implemented by a dictator who also will remain in history as such, Slobodan Milošević and his clique. This executioner chose Kosovo as the most appropriate level for its establishment in the peaks of power and certainly had not imagined then that was also his end.

Keywords: Recession of the State, swallowing, dictator, Kosovo.

Introduction

When the flow of war turns against the war founders of the twentieth century, they do not show anything except contempt of their own people. John G. Stoessinger

The volcanic disintegration of Tito's Yugoslavia began in Kosovo. The reasons were numerous. The violations of the rights by Serb forces against the Albanian majority population culminated in explosives and the situation kept getting tense.

In March 1981 demonstrations began which were led from Kosovar students seeking a greater political role for their compatriots (Stoessinger, 2007). They were joined by high school students, workers and even farmers who alongside economic slogans also casted political slogans out.

Since the requirements of the majority have never been treated seriously by the violent power, they were misinterpreted instead and they even began reducing more of rights that Kosovo had at that time. The unrest continued and gushed more powerfully in 1987. In the final analysis of the situation, the political reaction to the crisis in Kosovo not only did little to improve the situation, but it also angered it more (Noel, 2001, 351). Milošević crushed and changed its policies at will (Judah, 2002).

The former Yugoslav President Stambolic, instead of visiting Kosovo himself and see the situation closely, he decided to send his very old friend, Milošević. This cavalier

decision, would cost Stambolic his post and would lead Milošević towards a career of occupation and aggression in the name of Great Serbia (Stoessinger, 2007).

Dictatorial power and the beginning of Yugoslavia's collapse

If the disintegration of Yugoslavia was traced, the state with more prosperity and rights in the socialist world, a regional power in South East Europe, which hosted the Winter Olympics in 1984 and thousands of tourists from Western Europe in a single day, it will be the 24th of April 1987.

In that day, by the decision of his friend, the former president of Yugoslavia Ivan Stambolic, Milošević was sent to Kosovo to listen to some complaints of a group of angry Serbs in Kosovo Polje, alb. Fushe Kosove, who were complaining about the harassment and intimidation and were threatening that they will go in Belgrade to demonstrate.

A year earlier, Slobodan Milošević had become the highest functionary of the Serbian Communists. In the fall of the same year he published the notorious Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences which was developed earlier and seems to have been dropped in the hands of the dictator and served as sufficient basis to act in that way he did. It screamed against the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 and allegedly ascertained as the genocide against the Serbian people in Kosovo.¹

This memorandum was created as a kind of guiding document for the government by a group of Serbian academics led from Dobrica Cosic, who in 1992 also became the president of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, and that in itself contained all the old threads and the Serbian nationalism hatred, but on the other hand the tough criticism was reserved for the constitution of 1974, which it said had divided Serbia into three parts (Noel, 2001, 355).

The leitmotif of this document was: in Tito's Yugoslavia, Serbs were discriminated against.

In this libelous document which was also adapted to circumstances that were to be created from it, Albanians were accused of having declared war to the Serbs, that Albanians practice physical, political, legal and cultural genocide and that this is the biggest defeat for the Serbs since 1804.

In this text included also false statistics alleging that 200,000 Serbs were displaced during the previous two decades. This document concluded that the government need to assure long-term objective conditions for the return of the displaced and as a result was that the "integrity of the Serbian people" must be raised in a great interest for the Serbian politics (Noel, 2001, 351).

But this document despite all that it represented an attack against all Yugoslavia.² The pretext of this document and implementation of it through the arrival of Milošević in power turned Kosovo in the most dangerous place in the former Yugoslavia by making life so severe and paralyzing for the Albanian people for two decades, by taking Kosovo's autonomy and the rights provided by the constitution of 1974, but

¹ http://www.kosova-aktuell.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2327:kronologjike-e-zhvilimit-politik-te-kosoves&catid=10&Itemid=113 (07. 03. 2016).

² http://www.kosova-aktuell.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2327:kronologjike-e-zhvilimit-politik-te-kosoves&catid=10&Itemid=113 (07. 03. 2016).

the document was not only dangerous for Kosovo.

Under the Constitution of Yugoslavia in 1974, Kosovo's status has been almost equivalent to that of republics. This changed in mid-1989, under the leadership of Milošević when Serbia drafted another constitution which illegally abolished the former status of Kosovo as an autonomous province in Yugoslavia (Stavileci, 2008, 351). The content of the amendments of that constitution seriously violated the constitutional and legal position of Kosovo.

The document in question which had obviously unveiled and was overflowing in Serb nationalism, was seen as a risk for the other peoples of Yugoslavia too, more so when this document was published just when Milošević was also revealed in power over the turbulent nationalist waters like an occupying and consuming strong tornado.

The desire to conquer is certainly the most natural and most common among the people, and whenever they realize it and are successful, they are valued says Machiavelli (Machiavelli, 2003, 24).

The rise of Milošević in power was seen with great fear from other republics (Stoessinger, 2007).

The concerns grew not only because of the bad treatment that Serbia was doing its neighbor provinces and Montenegro, but more because of their dragged courtesy of a breakthrough into federal Yugoslav institutions.

Not much wisdom was needed to understand the formula behind the claims and desires of the nationalist and non-saturated chauvinists. It had become clear that the Serbian leader's ambitions stretched far away from Serbia. He was aiming to put all Yugoslavia under his control as a successor of Tito (Stoessinger, 2007).

Slovenia was the first republic that openly expressed its opposition to the coexistence in a Yugoslavia dominated by Serbs and the communist system.

Slovenia the sense of threat had increased, but the same happened in Sarajevo, Zagreb and the possibilities of the destruction of Yugoslavia through a policy like that of Milošević were made clear (Meier, 1996, 155). How Milošević and his clique lead was made known by Kosovo, which experienced a real apartheid.

In the Congress of the Communist Party in 1990, organized and convened urgently by Milošević, since holding a superb rally in the capital of Slovenia was canceled in December 1989 by the authoritative Slovenia, Slovenia got criticized from Milošević about it, but they used his criticisms as even a more powerful tool to express the reason for a different state, asking for pluralism and democracy for all Yugoslavia, which was rejected categorically from Milošević.

Slovenian delegates left the convention to never return. In April 1990 they announced elections for a sovereign Slovenia and with this action Slovenia becomes the first republic to secede from the federation and thus starting the breakup of Tito's Yugoslavia (Stoessinger, 2007).

Slovenia succeeded to break away much easier than other republics and Kosovo, which besides the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia broke away and formed their own countries with a lot of blood on the open battlefields and led by the Tsar Serbia called Milošević. The Vojvodina province is still engulfed in Serbia.

Kosovo, Milošević's tornado and vortex

History knows peaks of developments, civilizations, the blooming and happiness of nations, but it also knows peaks of tragedies, exterminations, never ending pain throughout the era and centuries (Braha, 1991, 7). Kosovo recognizes the last following ones the most.

After the Second World War, the Albanians of Kosovo found themselves in a state in which the Slavic majority looked at them with suspicion and hostility. Miranda Vickers says: "Kosovo emerged from the war in Yugoslavia's new federal state in a condition of siege with the population that was seen as a threat to the new state". To eliminate this threat Tito and Stalin agreed that Kosovo would be united with Albania, but meanwhile Tito played a different role with a special caution by betraying his promise to Albanian leader Enver Hoxha in 1946 that Kosovo and other areas populated by Albanians would belong to Albania and would be returned but not in such complicated circumstances, when the Serb nationalism was significantly more, and Greater Serbian regime would not agree with this decision.

Despite that Tito had not kept his promise, he gradually began to improve political conditions in Kosovo, but also the conditions of life in general, especially after the 1968s protests.

After a several years debate, the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia on February 21, 1974 approved the new Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and a few days later they did the same thing at that level on their republics and provinces (Akademia e shkencave e Shqipërisë, 1999, 124). Kosovo's constitution was passed on 28. 02. 1974. It was the first constitution of the Socialist Province of Kosovo. By this constitution, Kosovo benefited some rights that had been lacking especially in education and culture. Although this constitution provided progress in some areas for the Albanians, in the political spectrum was not enough. On the other hand, the Serbs saw it as advancing for the Albanians and a detriment for the Serbs in Kosovo. These confrontations led to the conflict that broke out in March 1981, in the canteen of students in Pristina, where Albanians decided to say enough on the repression and injustice that was exerted on them for almost a century by the Serb chauvinism.

The authorities responded by sending an army there in early February to stop the demonstrations that erupted recently in Kosovo (Judah, 2002, 91). After the events of 1981, the political, social and legal status of Albanians and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo started shrinking. Europe but also the international community in general, had not marked the power of the gunpowder called Yugoslavia as their priority in their agendas, which could explode much wider than itself.

This phenomenon became visible with the arrival of Milošević as the president of Serbia's in 1985, which was supported by the conservative forces of the Serbian nationalists. He used the silence of Europe, and the International Community as well as other republics of former Yugoslavia in regarding to the case of Kosovo, as well as to enhance his political authority, he took advantage from the nationalist card, a permanent and efficient tool, reigniting emotions of old Serb nationalist in the sense of the "victimization" of Serbia.

Albanians were suffering on a daily basis. The dismissal of the Albanian employees

and supplementing them with Serbians continued in all departments. This caused a social crisis in the Albanian families. Albanian Schools at all levels were closed, students began being poisoned. Arrests, beatings, abuses and imprisonments had flooded Kosovo. Life had become gloomy and without a perspective, fraught with danger for life. Youth started fleeing from Kosovo took the world in their eye seeking for a more stable life and most importantly without danger.

They also fled from the compulsory military service in the Yugoslav Army from which dozens of young Albanians returned in coffins, killed by this army itself.

Many boys who served in of army, in the quality of a soldier, cadet or an officer in these school, were mistreated, abused, labeled with titles like traitors of Yugoslavia, were also imprisoned while the intelligence services of this army, which claimed to be for the people, made files which ruined their life in this state.

The rise of his power of Milošević rose with to his trip to Kosovo. He won the admiration of the special Serbian nationalist through rallies which he organized where he promised to protect their interests.³ His main strategic platform to ascent in power was the issue of human rights, which was also made the central theme in which he alleged the discrimination against the Serb minority living in Kosovo by Albanians (Reuter & Clewing, 2000, 187).

With this he prepared his field of action from Belgrade to abolish the autonomy of Kosovo and to obtain all the administrative functions under his control through the domination of Serb officials in all the departments. The historic case of his rise happened when he came to Kosovo in April 1987 sent by his friend and chief Stambolic, to listen to the Serb requests and complaints about the "difficult" conditions of life in Kosovo. His party supporters, had organized an informative meeting in the Municipal Assembly of Kosovo Polje in which Serbian nationalists from Kosovo had been invited, to present their concerns in front of the envoys from Belgrade. While the meeting was held, in the vicinity of the Municipal Assembly, outside a large crowd of Serb protesters had gathered and were shouting "Slobo, Slobo, we want weapons, we want weapons, we cannot live here" etc, and the intelligence infiltrators were directing the developments through their associates. Near the protestors a truck full of stones was close that would serve to strike the officers keeping right order, where Albanian policemen were among them too, and the protestors used these emotions fueled by all that was happening and initiated violence.

It resulted into a clash with the police that were trying to keep the situation under control and calm the crowd of protesters down, but the protesters had quite enough stones and opposed the police, injuring some of them.

By seeing what was happening outside, Milošević interrupted the meeting and appeared in front of the crowd and as soon as he heard some complaints from some Serb protesters that were nearby who complained saying that they are beating us, they are beating us, he addressed to Serbians protesters with these words: *"No one will dare to beat you You must stay here. Here is your land. Here are your memories and homes. But I am not saying that must remain suffering and resisting a situation with which you are not satisfied It was never in the character of Serbs and Montenegrins to retreat in front of challenges and to demobilize in times of war. You need to stay here, for the sake of your*

³ <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/cron.html> (8. 04. 2016).

ancestors and descendants. Otherwise your ancestors will be desecrated and your descendants disappointed " (Petrisch & Pichler, 2005, 93).

This speech completed the goals and strategy of Milošević and made him the right man at the right moment initially for Kosovo's Serbs, but then also to all Serbs wrapped in the blanket of the Great Serbian nationalism and chauvinism, wherever they were. He was the legend of "salvation", but by whom and from what?

These words were the ones that evoked emotions in the weeks and months ahead and that led to further developments and political decisions.

After this speech, the Serbian mass started cheering "Slobo, Slobo" who then attacked the Albanians who fled from the square in the above mess (Stoessinger, 2007).

It was an adventure of aficionados, it was a devouring vortex of a dictator who saw himself as the strongest leader after Tito which rose him fast making him the most powerful man and also the president of the Yugoslav Federation 1997-2000, but it was just an adventure and nothing more, which just as fast as it raised, so it ended and removed him from the power and later sent him to the Hague International Court to be adjudicated as the responsible one, for the disasters he caused to other non-Yugoslavian people where he too ended his career in the same way as both his parents. Both his parents had killed themselves.

Conclusions

A thought for oneself passes on exorbitant distraction, and lightness; The same thing coupled with envy goes on rampage; Rampant opinion to the authenticity of something that others oppose to leads to rage (Hobbes, 2000, 45).

All the dictators that climb to the power by force end up like that as well. It seems that Milošević did not care about Hobbes's remarks, but nor had he fully addressed Prince, especially the part where it is explained what could happen if he makes a mistake, or perhaps he was not interested at all to deal with this part, at the time of his power and paradise. His desire to be the second Tito sank right in Tito's villa, which he made available for himself.

The situation that he created from Kosovo, in Kosovo, and the following wars were a matter of survival for the intentional conquests that he did.

During his journey towards the government, he relied on human rights, but in practice he passed on the opposite side of the human rights, thus becoming the biggest enemy to them.

His takeover on the territories of Serbia's neighbors in search of the great Serbia, were mandatorily turned to those belonging. He seemed to have thought that he would be able to change the history, forgetting that throughout it any country that started an unjust war towards another, failed to achieve its aims.

Without having a sufficient distance to events, crises and fatal wars, that through spilled blood, produced the disintegration of Yugoslavia, produced new states and brought a dictator of this level on the spotlight, I am not quite sure that through this article I managed to show all what happened. We will leave it to the time to fully reveal things, but I am sure that none of us will be the same as before, after this tragedy which ended the twentieth century in this horrible way, in southeastern

Europe.

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