

Caesaropapism of Constantine the Great and today's reflection

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Abstract

The emperor Constantine has rightly been called the most important emperor of Late Antiquity. His powerful personality laid the foundations of post-classical European civilization; his reign was eventful and highly dramatic. His victory at the Milvian Bridge counts among the most decisive moments in world history, while his legalization and support of Christianity and his foundation of a 'New Rome' at Byzantium rank among the most momentous decisions ever made by a European ruler (Encyclopediae Catholicae, 1911). The king (regnum) and the priest (sacerdotium) have always been the two centers of power and authority in human society and government. Until modern times the most common form of government in the world unified these two powers in one way or another. Caesaropapism is a political system in which the head of the state is also the head of the church and supreme judge in religious matters. The term is most frequently associated with the late Roman, or Byzantine, Empire. The concept of caesaropapism had reflections in daily life, in the political system, religion etc. Many states adopted this political system which was modified later in different form thanks to his power.

Keywords: Caesaropapism, Constantine the Great, reflection, today.

Introduction

The term was created by the great sociologist *Max Weber*. Obviously, the word's two elements are "Caesar" -- i.e., the secular power -- and "papism" -- i.e., the religious power of a pope. Caesaropapism denotes a combined secular and ecclesiastical government in which the secular ruler, who enjoys a special religious status, exercises authority over the church even in spiritual and internal affairs. Since *J.H. Böhmer* at the beginning of the 18th century, the term has been applied particularly to the ecclesiastical authority of the emperors from Constantine the Great (Wall, 2015) until the Investiture Controversy (Clauss, 2015).

It is, however, different from theocracy, which is a political order where the religious authority of a country is in control of all of the secular affairs of state (Iran is an example). While the two concepts are intertwined, it's hard to say which came first and whether one was a reaction to the other or if they were separate phenomena or what. Christian notion of *caesaropapism*-of religious and political authority as different types of rule nonetheless exercised by it single person-is another concept that simply does not exist in Confucianism or any other form of government with caesaropapist substrate.

But caesaropapism took place especially in the Eastern Church. Caesaropapism's chief example is the authority that the Byzantine (East Roman) Emperors had over the Church of Constantinople or Eastern Christian Church from the 330 consecration of Constantinople through the tenth century (Cross, Livingstone, 1983, 178).

The Emperor exercised a strong control over the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and the Patriarch of Constantinople could not hold office if he did not have the Emperor's approval (Latourette, 1975, 283). Eastern men like St. John Chrysostom, Patriarch of Constantinople and St. Athanasius, Patriarch of Alexandria, strongly opposed imperial control over the Church, as did Western theologians like St. Hilary and Hosius, Bishop of Córdoba (Cordoba, 1956, 109). Such Emperors as Basiliscus, Zeno, Justinian I, Heraclius, and Constans II published several strictly ecclesiastical edicts either on their own without the mediation of church councils, or they exercised their own political influence on the councils to issue the edicts (Schaff, 1974, 135).

The caesaropapism was spread from prehistoric times from the sacred traditions of the ancient kingdoms like Egypt, Mesopotamia, Babilonia, China etc. Next to be considered was caesaropapism in the Holy Roman Empire, Byzantine Empire, in the Ottoman Empire, and in the modern Saudi Arabia. Hierocracy, «the rule of the clerics», was also prevalent in the central Middle Ages (1100- 1300), and the late Middle Ages (1300-1500) (Swenson, 379. 2009) to be continue in Russia and in central Europe and still today continues to be present across many countries in the world in various forms. The secular paradigm or the Cæsaropapal model is well illustrated in the Eastern Church, particularly in Russia. In 860 AD, the Moravian prince Rastislav asked the Byzantine Emperor to send missionaries to the Slavs. The Emperor obliged and after a short period of missionary activity, two monks, Cyril and Methodius, earned great success. A state Church was instituted and became very common in the East. In 988, Vladimir sent envoys to Islam, Latin Christianity, Judaism, and Eastern Christianity to investigate which one would best suit his purposes for a national religion. He chose Eastern Christianity and ordered the mass baptism of all Russians (Swenson, 277, 2009). This is a classic example of the use of power not to persuade conversion but to coerce it. Between 1451 and 1452, Constantinople fell to the Turkish Muslims, and the primary seat of Eastern Christianity was evacuated. Moscow then came to be known as the "Third Rome": the center of the Russia as well the spiritual centre of the East (Steeves, 310-313, 1979).

The paradigm had a much longer history in the East from the time of the first Christian Emperor to the fall of the Czarist state in Russia in 1917. Marty defines it as "the monarchical control over ecclesiastical affairs; particularly, it connotes the intrusion of a civil officer into the sanctuary, the crossing of line from the imperial to the priestly." In Russia, Marty continues, it means that the church was in some way a *department of state organization* (Marty, 141, 1959).

The reason why the caesaopapism is very useful in politic is its nature to capture the power. This power is concentrated in the hands of the head of the state which has absolute power. This is why it is still in use in many countries all over the world.

Therefore the base of caesaropapism, as a notion is related with the greatest emperor of antiquity Constantine the Great which for the first time applied this form in official applied. Even the conversion of Constantine and the privileges of Christianity till in the moment when Christianity became the state religion in the time of Theodosius did not fundamentally Christianise the empire: where the imperial tradition survived, in the East, the Government was crypto-pagan. This is exactly what the polemical literature had set out to imply when, at the time of iconoclasm or of the union of the

Churches, it had travestied any Byzantine emperor imbued with his religious role and anxious to extirpate the last vestiges of paganism from the Church, by calling him a persecuting tyrant or Antichrist (Dvomik, 11, 1966).

In continuing and completing the work of Diocletian, Constantine established the basis of the Byzantine state which was to exist for more than a millennium after him and was to preserve Greek literature and codify Roman law; this is no mean achievement. Ten emperors after him, including the last emperor of Byzantium, carried his name, and a new emperor could receive no greater compliment than to be called "a new Constantine." This Byzantine state derived a substantial part of its identity from its religion; it was built on an alliance of throne and altar. But the two partners in this alliance were not equals; there was always a preponderance of imperial authority over ecclesiastical authority (Pohlsander, 91, 2004).

The Council of Nicaea saw it as the messianic kingdom had begun. The fulsome flattery of the emperor, who at this time was not even nominally a Christian, was rendered in true oriental style, and yet in both the East and the West the political ruler had from this time on to share his power with the priest and the church her power with paganism. The attitude of the political ruler or ruling class was, of course, that the priest was to occupy himself with men's souls and with heaven and eternity, and incidentally assist the state to maintain peace and order. The attitude of the priest, equally naturally, was that the political ruler was to do the bidding of the church as the supreme power, whenever the church claimed that her interests were involved. Thus an impossible dualism between a "religious" and a "secular" state became the prevalent assumption and works its havoc on into our own day (Hall, 13, 1988).

Jacob Burckhardt characterized Constantine in *The Age of Constantine the Great* as an "essentially irreligious" statesman who grasped the strength of Christian organization and turned it to his own political ends: "Attempts have often been made to penetrate into the religious consciousness of Constantine and to construct a hypothetical picture of changes in his religious convictions. Such efforts are futile. In a genius driven without surcease by ambition and lust for power there can be no question of Christianity and paganism, of conscious religiosity or unreligiosity; such a man is essentially unreligious, even if he pictures himself standing in the midst of a churchly community" (Drake, 2, 1955; Berkley, 292, 1983).

But after defeating his eastern colleague Licinius in 324 and moving an operation to his new eponymous capital, Constantine finally was able to implement the repressive measures that heretofore he had only been able to recommend (Drake, 6, 1995).

As the Eusebius describe Constantine the great like the man who will became the Christian protector in basis he was the profiteer in this situation even in the end of his life he died like Christiane one in his death bad. Few historical sources from Late Antiquity have attracted so much scholarly attention as Eusebius' *Life of Constantine*, and few passages have been at the centre of so extended a debate as those in which Constantine is referred to as 'bishop', for they seem to encapsulate the Byzantine vision of imperial authority in its relation to Christianity.¹ But how Constantine

¹ For the history of the debate see F. Winkelmann, (1962), 187-243, repr. in his *Studien zu Konstantin dem Grossen und zur byzantinischen Kirchengeschichte. Ausgewählte Aufsätze*, ed. W. Brandes, J. F. Haldon (Birmingham, 1993); J.-M. Sansterre, (1972), 131-95, 532-94; D. De Decker, G. Dupuis-Masay, (1980), 118-57.

managed to become fans and supporters of Christianity?

Constantine ruled a pagan Empire, which revered many of his predecessors as gods and which granted him also the pagan honor of apotheosis after his death. The ideological and institutional fusion between Church and Empire which would have transmuted Hellenistic into Christian attributions of imperial divinity, which would have changed the pagan form into Caesaropapism, had not occurred by the time of Constantine's death (Morrison, 5, 1964). He had taken the first step toward the stage where the two institutions would be commingled, and where Hellenistic concepts concerning divine kingship would become Caesaropapism (Morrison, 7, 1964).

The fusing of Church and Empire into one institution was only begun in the fourth century; as we have suggested, the two still remained fundamentally independent in the minds of orthodox thinkers until the end of that period. At the same time, they had approximated one another, and their relations under Theodosius were far different from those under Constantine. Constantine regarded Christianity as a favored cult, but he tolerated the other religions within the Empire. While he entertained bishops in splendour which some praised as an image of the heavenly kingdom,² he also functioned as the *pontifex maximus* of the State paganism, supplying members to its priestly colleges and public funds for its sacrifices and rituals. The image of an emperor never wholly cleansed of his paganism and too accustomed to being *pontifex maximus* has permeated almost all historiography since.³

Better documented instances of early caesaropapism in the ancient world can be found in Egypt. The Pharaoh was naturally the king of Egypt, but he was also a living god.⁴ This sacred status was a side effect of being the Pharaoh, and the country's religious institutions were nominally under his control, and indeed were partially dedicated to his cult. This doesn't mean there wasn't tension between the secular authority of the king and the spiritual realm of the priests, however. The High Priest of Amun, or First Prophet of Amun, was the highest-ranking priest in the priesthood of the Ancient Egyptian God Amun (Dodson & Hilton, 2004). The religious establishment of the country was dominated by the priests of Amun headquartered in the city of Thebes

An excellent recent study of Byzantine imperial ideology is G. Dagron, (1996).

² Vita Constantini, III, 15 (Migne, Patrologia Graeca 20: 1074). Bauer and Muller both emphasize the gradualness of change in imperial religious policy under Constantine the Great, and they reject the position that Constantine's actions were caesaropapistic. C. Bauer, (1931): especially p. 113: "Einen grundsatzlichen 'Casaropapismus' in dem Sinne, dass die byzantinischen Kaiser selbst ein formelles Recht, die Kirche zu lehren und zu regieren beansprucht hatten, hat es nie gegeben. Praktisch haben sie fast alle tief in das kirchliche Personen- und Verwaltungsrecht eingegriffen. . . ." H. Muller, (1946) 1: pp. 23, 34 ff. But see Biondi, who does not consider in detail the juristic bases of Church-Empire relations in the fourth century. B. Biondi, II, (1952) 1: p. 185: "Per designare questa situazione, in cui l'imperatore interviene liberamente nell' ambito della Chiesa in questioni di fede, si e escagitato il termine di cesarismo o cesaropapismo. . . . Constantino si qualifica come fondatore del cesaropapismo.

³ See, for example, M. Meslin and J. Grosdidier de Matons, (1968), For the thre significance of the title of *pontifex maximus* in the late Roman Empire, see R. Schilling, (1994), pp. 75-90.

⁴ In preancient time all emperors had divine nature, and its normally when you are in this position you can fill unattached. Absolute power was necessary to be in the had of the state ore empire. This is the first form of archaic caesaropapism.

and they exercised great political power in their own right. Perhaps feeling that the priests were over-reaching, the 18th Dynasty Pharaoh Amenhotep IV (Cyril, 259-268, 1991) (fl. 14th century BC) suddenly had a revelation that there was only one god: the sun disc, called the Aten.

Even more amazingly, Amenhotep "discovered" that the only person on the planet who could commune with the Aten was himself. Accordingly, he changed his name to Akhenaten and mandated the monotheistic worship of the Aten, which just coincidentally had the effects of removing any political clout the Amun priesthood had and of consolidating all power in the hands of the royal family⁵.

But the classical meaning of caesaropapism, of course, is best understood by looking at the people who brought us the terms "Caesar" and "Papism." During the time of the Roman Empire (27 BC to 476 AD in the West, survived until 1453 AD in the East called later Byzantine Empire), many religious innovations occurred. This was a natural outgrowth of the large area controlled by the Romans, spanning from Magrebian coast in the west to Armenia in the east, and from England in the north to Egypt in the south. Since almost all religions in the ancient world (or at least the parts controlled by the Romans) were polytheistic until the first appearance of monotheism, there was nothing odd or out of place about someone from Gaul venerating Cerunnos, Jupiter, Apollo and Isis all at once. In fact, the Romans like the Greeks before them believed that all the gods of the various peoples they encountered were basically the same gods they worshipped under different names with perhaps slightly different attributes. The Germanic thunder god Thor, for example, was considered just a regional variant of Jupiter, which was another name for Zeus. The Egyptian god Osiris⁶, through his association with fertility and resurrection, was just a somewhat more morbid Bacchus or Dionysus. Even the sole god of the Israelites, YHWH⁷, was sometimes thought to be a really weird version of Satur. The word caesaropapism was coined by Flavius Josephus in connection with the Jewish people,⁸ who provide the best reference point for all forms of theocracy—original theocracy of the Covenant, dominated by the great figure of Moses, theocracy of the anointed kings, theocracy of the high priests. The rigidity of the system was only slightly relaxed by the creation of the levitical priesthood and the emergence of a political power; it was still God who decreed and the prophet who spoke in His name, or interpreted the Law that was His expression (Dagron, 282, 2003). So in one ore in another form caesaropapism was present in ancient civilisations in the east which slowly removed in the western part especially in Roman Empire when the concept of caesaropapism has the full mining. Since the official religious milieu of the Roman Empire was based on the Roman emperor and he was the head of all the state-sanctioned religious enterprises, it would make sense to describe the pagan Roman emperors as caesaropapists.

⁵ <http://everything2.com/title/caesaropapism?searchy=search>

⁶ <http://everything2.com/title/Osiris>

⁷ <http://everything2.com/title/YHWH>

⁸ Against Apian, II, 165 ; p.804 of the Works of Josephus, trans. Whiston(London, 1860, revised edition Peabody, 1987) ; 'our legislator(Moses) had no regard to any of these forms(monarchy, oligarchy, democracy) but hi ordained our government to be what, by a strained expression, may be termed a Theocracy, by ascribing the authority and of power to God'.

The new period from the beginning of Diocletian's reign, the era of the dominance is reflected in the official royal propaganda. The Caesar will be *Dominus et Deus*, his divine descent receives primary importance (Kolb, 22, 2001). Due to the public policy of the Empire, the rulers appeared as progenies of Jupiter and Hercules. Constantine the Great distanced himself from the pagan Herculean title of emperors (Kolb, 58-59, 2001), and opposed to Licinius he became the defender of Christians. This decision will help him a lot later when he came in power, but he made a good calculation because the number of Christians in empire was growing and this organized force should definitely enter under his command. He decided wisely that this measure will bring him a lot of benefits. The best solution for him was to be the first of them which in fact leads to caesaropapism. In this case began to get involved the sun cult with Christianity. The emphasized cult of Sol prepared the triumph of Christianity. The young Apollo became similar to Jesus, as well as a *kosmokrator* (Kolb, 63, 2001). The *Triakontaeterikos* of Eusebius of Caesarea, i.e. the *Praise of Constantine (Laus Constantini)* was an anniversary laudation of Constantine's thirty-year reign.⁹

Civil war consumed the Roman world at the beginning of the fourth century, and although religion was not the cause of it, it did play an important part in it. In 311, the emperor Galerius who had been one of the most virulent persecutors of Christians indicated that Christians would not be legally held to account for their faith so long as they prayed to their own God for the safety of the empire and the emperor. A joint declaration issued by the co-emperors Constantine I and Licinius in 313 normalized Christianity's legal status and allowed it to enjoy the same civil protections as the official state religion of Rome. Christological debates raged throughout the 4th century with emperors becoming ever more involved with the Church and the Church becoming ever more divided (Dale & Sunquist, 164, 2002). The Council of Nicaea in 325 supported the Athanasian view. The Council of Rimini in 359 supported the Arian view. The Council of Constantinople in 360 supported a compromise that allowed for both views in religion known as *Semi-Arianism* (Herbermann, 1913). The Council of Constantinople in 381 (Heather & Matthews, 136, 1991 re-asserted the Athanasian view and rejected the Arian view. Emperor Constantine was of divided opinions (even as to whether he was Christian) but he largely backed the Athanasian faction (though he was baptized on his death bed by the Arian bishop Eusebius of Nicomedia). While Constantine evidently did not seek to influence the outcome of the council, he continued the tradition of his pagan predecessors by using his temporal power to shape the events of the spiritual world. With the Edict of Thessalonica of 27 February 380, Emperor Theodosius I established the Christianity of the First Council of Nicaea as the official state religion, reserving for its followers the title of Catholic Christians (Bettenson, 1963). When Christianity was made the only legal religion, Roman caesaropapism in the Christian context was firmly established.

This transition from broad toleration to the establishment of a State religion, exclusive of all other cults, must be explained with reference to three factors: the emperor, the

⁹ Eusebius, *Über das Leben des Constantins, Constantins Rede an die heilige Versammlung, Tri-cennatsrede an Constantin*. Vol. I. Ed. I. A. HEIKEL. Leipzig 1902 and Berlin 1975. In *Praise of Constantine: A Historical Study and New Translation of Eusebius' Tricennial Orations*. Ed. by H. A. Drake.

imperial power, and the Empire. These factors were the main objectives of all emperors. Each of them depended on some form from Christianity too that already had become a key factor in Empire. These were distinct elements in the Roman constitution. The Empire was the scene of the action; the imperial power, the instrument; the emperor, the motivator and director. By the end of the fourth century, the emperors had used their powers not merely to acknowledge the Christian community as a legitimate part of the Empire, but much more, to make the Empire a Christian community (Morrison, 20, 1964).

The period from the conversion of Constantine to the death of Justinian is not only that in which the crucial problem of the imperial authority over the church became crystallized; it is also one of the formative eras with regard to monumental church building, perhaps the most formative in the history of the church.

Of the fifteen emperors of the Byzantine East and the somewhat greater number in the West during the period from A.D. 312 to 565, by far the most important as regards church construction were the first, Constantine the Great, and the last, Justinian.

By the time of Constantine the church was a sufficiently robust organization for the emperor to engage it as a partner in unifying the empire. Systems of authority, patterns of belief and control of funds and property had turned the early household communities into an interlinked, empire-wide organization that increasingly mirrored the structure of the empire itself. It is a telling fact that when Julian the Apostate tried to put the clock back in the 360s, he 'determined to introduce into the pagan temples the order and discipline of Christianity':

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¹⁰ Vita Constantini, III, 15 (Migne, *Patrologia Graeca* 20: 1074). Bauer and Muller both emphasize the gradualness of change in imperial religious policy under Constantine the Great, and they reject the position that Constantine's actions were caesaropapistic. C. Bauer, (1931): especially p. 113: "Einen grundsatzlichen 'Caesaropapismus' in dem Sinne, dass die byzantinischen Kaiser selbst ein formelles Recht, die Kirche zu lehren und zu regieren beansprucht hatten, hat es nie gegeben. Praktisch haben sie fast alle tief in das kirchliche Personen- und Verwaltungsrecht eingegriffen. . . ." H. Muller, (1946) 1: pp. 23, 34 ff. But see Biondi, who does not consider in detail the juristic bases of Church-Empire relations in the fourth century. B. Biondi, II, (1952) 1: p. 185: "Per designare questa situazione, in cui l'imperatore interviene liberamente nell'ambito della Chiesa in questioni di fede, si e escagitato il termine di cesarismo o cesaropapismo. . . . Constantino si qualifica come

functioned as the pontifex maximus of the State paganism, supplying members to its priestly colleges and public funds for its sacrifices and rituals.

Henry Bynes says: "In the case of a man of genius, whose ambition and love of power refuse to him a moment's peace, there can be no question of Christianity or paganism, of conscious religion or irreligion. Such a man, even when he persuades himself that he has his place (Baynes, 4, 1929; Burckhardt, 369, 1898).

So for him the most important thing is to be *the head of power*, because the past of roman Empire and specially pontifex maximus influenced directly in his decisions. While christianity like new events in Roman Empire was seen from his side like oportunity to enforcing his position. As we later see christianity became one of the most organized community in whole empire and in this case normally he so the danger to be against this force, and hi start to support and finally to became the man who will controll whole empire establishing the caesaropapist order. Constantine shared the enlightened idea of one Supreme God, but it took some time before he identified him with the God of the Christians. He obviously adhered to the contemporary veneration of the sun as highest god.

We must remember that, in the history of Rome, the religion and the state were always intertwined. The transition from Republic to Principate tightened the link, since from Augustus; the prince was also Pontifex Maximus, that is to say the supreme authority of traditional religion. Augustat and Pontificate went together well in hand until Gratian and Theodosius, who decline that dignity in 379. The connection between church and state is extremely complex and is as old as time itself.

The first permanent severing of the Christian community has beginnings lay in the division of the Roman Empire at the end of the third century. Thereafter, the Greek (Eastern) and Latin (Western) sections of the Roman world were administered separately. Their cultural and economic differences intensified. When the political institutions of the Latin empire collapsed in the fifth century, the Greek empire, centered in Constantinople, continued to flourish.

The sustaining institution during this period was the Christian church. Its theology dominated all forms of though in both the united East and the disintegrating West. Important issues, even worldly ones, were transposed into theological questions.

In church study, in relation between protestant church and state, Hasting makes an interesting connection between the Protestant Reformation and the caesaropapism characterizing the Eastern Empire. For him, after the Protestant Reformation Justinian's concept of the single empire, spiritual and temporal, ruled by its supreme head, the emperor was transferred to the national state and later, in due course, was effectively transferred to every German princeling (Hastings, 21, 1991). This unlikely correlation between Eastern Symphony and modern Western nation States is intriguing and worth analyzing (Romocea, 83, 2011).

Philip II of Spain provides the illustration for the sixteenth century. He controlled the finances of the church and its patronage. And through his Inquisition he also controlled theological and moral issues, at times in defiance of the pope, for political ends (Hastings, 30, 1956).

The protestant reformation of the sixteenth century reflected the political tensions

fondatore del cesaropapismo.

between emerging national groups and centralized imperial authority, as well as the social and economic transformations caused by the Renaissance in late medieval Europe. In general, Protestant religious groups, particularly the Lutherans and Calvinists, aligned with local and national political authorities (emperors and princes) from Northern Europe who were seeking to break from the Catholic Church's tutelage. Despite the profound irreligion of Louis XIV and his courtiers, and even various leading prelates, rigorous formal orthodoxy was made a matter of political loyalty as well as of etiquette. At a time when Protestant Holland and England had found even religious reasons for toleration, Louis XIV revived the sixteenth-century policy of persecution, but now as a requirement of his absolutism. In 1685 the Edict of Nantes was revoked and the attempt was renewed to exterminate French Protestantism. Protestant schools and churches were closed and pastors banished (Hastings, 32, 1956).

Similar issues of balance between power, responsibility, and interference that have characterized Byzantine and Roman church-state struggles were now being transferred to the level of national communities (Romocea, 85, 2011).

This statement created in Western Europe did not resist long as in the eastern part. Gradually later it's began to dominate the opinion when the state should be separated finally from the church. As we observed in generally to the east compared to the western part caesaropapism became stronger, and we can conclude that in the west caesaropapism going straight to the national state and the power of the emperor or the prince was smaller than in the eastern part, so it wasn't absolute as in the eastern part. This should probably be the reason why the west caesaropapism it's out of use but in the east some extent we have in use still today.

Gilbert Dagron made an important study on the relationship between church and state in the eastern and western empires, aims «to expose the mechanisms of a historiography that describes a Christian world divided from the beginning into two cultural zones, one western, where the temporal and spiritual powers were differentiated, the other eastern, were combined» (Dagron, 8, 2003).

While this story begins, as did the Western, with the account of relations between church and society, we are handicapped by the absence of a hinge figure to summarize the development: in short, we lack a St. Augustine. The transition to the medieval East is unmarked and smooth-breathed; little theory existed to justify changes. But the elision is seen in the "actual pressure of events" by the relationship described institutionally as Caesaropapism. The term implies monarchical control over ecclesiastical affairs; particularly, it connotes the intrusion of civil officer in sanctuary, the crossing of line from the imperial to the priestly. In the East this meant that the church was in some senses "a department of state organization": There was no possibility of an independent evolution, because the organs of the state interfered everywhere and there was no room for ecclesiastical autonomy. Those secular functions, which elsewhere were taken over by the church, had in Byzantium retained the character of public services.¹¹

An illustration of the difference in development between West and East appears in

¹¹ For a brilliant discussion of the transformation of this term, see Albert Outler,(1957), Chap. 4, "The Christian Tradition."

the arguments for the authority of these cities. In the West the decisive issue was the question of the apostolic origin of sees; the primacy of Rome was argued on an apostolic basis. In the East a more arbitrary claim on the basis of territorialism and geography prevailed. Constantinople claimed to be the "next after [meta] Rome" because it was the New Rome of the Emperor. As early as the Council of Antioch (341) this position was outlined; as early as this was the wedding of imperial -territorial and ecclesiastical fortunes prefigured (Martin, 143, 1959).

More typical of the growing imperial power of the East, a power that not only transcended personal criticism but even outdistanced Roman might, was Marcian's (— 457) success in holding the great ecumenical council at Chalcedon against the wishes of Pope Leo, who had desired Rome. Incidentally, the same occasion also reveals the limits of the imperial ecclesiastical tie. Marcian's resort to force to uphold the council's decisions failed to "convert" the opposing parties. A church dependent upon imperium became too dependent upon the whims and heartbeats of emperors and upon dynastic intrigues (Martin, 143, 1959).

During the reign of Emperor Justinian (and after 527) the position of caesaropapism became stronger than everywhere. This great monarch, whose power was nearly coextensive with his dreams, wanted to reunite the separating churches of East and West as he would rebuild the unity of the Empire. When he appeared on the scene he could claim to be the vice-regent of Christ on earth, as the pope claimed to be in the West. The whole earth would be his sphere of dominion. The instance of this Emperor has inspired in men of later centuries in the West a sense of gratitude for the greater popes, Leo and Gregory among them, who kept alive within a theocratic ideal a measure of tension between the spheres of the temporal and the spiritual. In the East what tension there was existed between two "spirituals" in quest of imperial favor? Thus in the Monothelite controversy in the seventh century, Sophronius, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, had to attack both the heresy and the emperor because of the semi-heretical alliances of the time. In later periods **Caesaropapism** was to play an unfortunate part in dividing the Church. In the Iconoclastic controversy the emperor initiated reform with little support from church or people. Germanus the Patriarch (—733) at best acquiesced and reluctantly followed in reform. The strength of Western reform had inherited in its "popular" character. In Eastern iconoclasm or iconodulism the church was secondary and often defensive (Martin, 145, 1959). Dagron admits the caesaropapism that characterized the eastern Roman Empire since the times of Justinian was a typically Byzantine perversion of the church-state symphony relationship, but argues that this was the product of religious movements in modern Europe (Dagron, 8, 2003). Dagron's challenging views stress that the caesaropapist terminology originated from the German protestant theologians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, who used the categories of papocaesarism and caesaropapism to denounce and dismiss from a protestant position both the papacy that ascribed to itself political power and any Justinians – styled princes and sovereigns who sought to manipulate and interfere in religious problems (Romocea, 84, 2011; Dagron, 283, 2003).

Besides Justinian and his immediate successors had much too good a grasp of theological principles to take seriously the formal claims of caesaropapism. Their

attitude is indicated by Justinian's Sixth Novella, dated March 16, 535: "the greatest gifts which God has granted to man are the priesthood and the empire, the priesthood concerns things divine, the empire presides over mortals". The goal to be achieved was an agreement or "symphony" between these two institutions, and not the subjection of one to the other (Meyendorff, 18, 2006).

Since Justinian strengthened even more caesaropapism roots, even in the Balkan region where Slavs placed after acceptance of Christianity become prey of caesaropapist concepts.

After Slavs arriving in Balkan area they took byzantine culture and they adopted caesaropapist ideas. Constantine and his mother Helena became the biggest saints in Orthodox Church. As the researcher Spinka concludes relating to Slavs establishing in Danubian provinces they will become followers of the Byzantines.

If the Slavs originally conquered the imperial Danubian provinces, the Byzantine culture in the end conquered them. But granting the essentially Byzantine character of the culture of the Balkan Slavs, they yet managed to make it truly national.

According to a plan called *Načertanije* (in English, the "Outline", also translated by the words "plan" or "Project"), written in 1844 by Ilija Garašanin in coordination with Serbian Orthodox church is a typical example how the caesaropapism roots have taken place in the Balkans since the time of Constantine the Great. In the same time we have *Megali Idea* too, the same project for creating the greater national states. These two successive and complementary processes - extending outside and inside homogenization - become the axes of politics and diplomacy of Serbia in the coming years (Grmek, 79, 1993). In this, the Garašanin text remains the reference of future claims for the creation of a Greater Serbia¹².

Of course, in a way, even this feature is genuinely Byzantine. The Orthodoxy of the Empire developed a spirit of submissiveness to the state which frequently degenerated into subservience. The church became an arm of the government, a department of the caesaropapist state (Matthew, 86, 1993). There are many examples of caesaropapism or caesaropapist tendencies throughout the medieval period. One of the most notable examples was what we now call the Investiture controversy, which saw the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV personally appoint (or "invest," hence the name) bishops throughout his lands in the late 10th and early 11th centuries. This was in direct violation of established church law and the reigning pope, Gregory VII, responded by excommunicating Henry and declaring his throne vacant. This caused many of Henry's vassals to openly rebel against him; Henry's response was to install his own pope. Needless to say, years of war followed and both Henry and Gregory died before the issue was satisfactorily resolved. In the early 14th century, King Philip IV of France entered into a lifelong feud with Pope Boniface VIII over the taxation and seizure of church property that became increasingly more violent, concluding with a physical assault on the pope that would claim his life in 1303. Boniface's successor, Benedict XI, attempted to reconcile with Philip, but still carried

¹² Remained confidential until 1906, this text is the first which clearly specified (defined) objectives of territorial expansion of Serbia. However, unlike the methods that will be applied later, he advocated only peaceful methods for the project, such as persuasion, propaganda, seduction, cultural assimilation etc. Paul Garde, (2000), p. 19. Paul Garde, *Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie: Nouvelle édition*, Fayard.

out certain of his predecessor's policies that precluded any real hope for peace. When Benedict died less than a year later, Philip intervened in the election of the next pope, the Frenchman Clement V, and "invited" the papal court to move from Rome to the French city of Avignon. It remained there for nearly a century, serving as little more than an extension of French royal power. We call this period the Avignon Papacy today, but in the Catholic church it is known as the Babylonian Captivity, recalling the occupation of Judah by Babylon and the forced relocation of the Jews into Mesopotamia.

However, during the times of ottomans (1300-1922) in Muslim history, a major changes happened; a movement from hierocracy to caesaropapism. During this time, the Sultan was primarily a head of state and only secondarily a religious leader.

The old Byzantine tradition modified itself after 1453, was the relationship between the church and the head of state (Beck, 1981). A fascinating question is how lawyers utilizing Orthodox canon law in the Ottoman Empire adapted the law in order to allow for subjugation to a Muslim sovereign. In a 17th century post-Byzantine legal codification, the Ottoman Sultan assumed the role that the Byzantine Basileus had previously played in Orthodox canon law. This example of post-Byzantine law shows that just as in Byzantine times, the patriarch was subject to the head of state, meaning the sultan in the Ottoman Empire, for political matters (Merlino, 5, 2004). It appears that the title chalif was used to offer more legitimacy to the position of sultan. Nevertheless, Arnold provides an abundance of historical evidence that reveals a close link between the religious and political leadership of the Islamic world, first in the form of a Hierocracy (the chaliphate and politics) and then in the form of Caesaropapism (the sultanate and religion) (Swenson, 110, 2009) the blend of religious roles that is evident in the chaliph's position begs investigation of the caliphate as a leadership facing the dilemma of mixed motivation. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Shi'ism markedly diverged from the general Islamic pattern, becoming more similar to Western Christianity. As was the case with the papacy in medieval Western Muslim "Church Government" Christianity, in sharp contrast to Byzantine caesaropapism and its Russian heir, it was the successful institutional translation of the separation of the religious and the political spheres that subsequently gave the Shi'ite hierocracy tremendous political power as the independent custodians of religion and of the sacred law (Arjomand, 265, 1984). Even to this day in Islamic countries where countries first has power over religion which controls state and religion have to do with caesaropapism. The example of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, Iran's Ayatollah I Khomein etc. is typical examples of caesaropapism adapting to current circumstances.

The protestant reformation of the XVI century reflected the political tensions between emerging national groups and centralized imperial authority, as well as the social and economic transformations caused by the Renaissance in late medieval Europe. In general, Protestant religious groups, particularly the Lutherans and Calvinists, aligned with local and national political authorities (emperors and princes) from northern Europe who were seeking to break from the Catholic Church's tutelage. The protestant reformation was not sufficiently capable of breaking with the pattern of church-state caesaropapism or papocaesarism, except in its radical forms inherent

in the Reformation "sects", the Puritans and the Spiritualists. Although critical of the papacy and its abuse of power, the reformed churches soon assumed the role previously played by the Catholic churches in a number of European countries. The Reformation led to caesaropapism in Catholic lands as well as in those breaking away from papal control. In France the state soon went beyond the powers granted by the concordat of 1516 (Conrad, 26, 1937).

However, in the *cuius regio, ejus religio* doctrine is found the emergence of a crucial coupling between religious and national identity, which radically shapes the church-state distinction, both in Byzantium and the West, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

In France after the radical period of the National Convention(1792-95), the church would gradually re-emerge as tolerated during the Directory (1795-99), with the Concordat between Pope Pius VII and Napoleon Bonaparte(1801) (Bunson, 240, 1995) finally normalizing the relationship between the papacy and the French State. The civil constitution of the clergy reduced the status of the priests to simply state employees and, aided by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) and the abolition of the monarchy, the Catholic church lost its status as the state religion, as confirmed by the French constitution of 1791. The separation between church and state led to the founding of public education, which replaced religion as a subject of study with the 1789 Declaration, Constitution, and republican morality.

As is obvious from the proliferation of national/state churches after Henry VIII, caesaropapism is still alive today. Mainly this is strictly a formal arrangement since most contemporary monarchies are constitutionally limited in terms of the real power they exercise. Caesaropapism seems to be an older concept than theocracy, although obviously the lines can become blurred and controversy exists over which is the more ancient form. It's difficult to assess caesaropapism in Islamic history since the line between secular and religious power is often blurred, although it could be said the Ottoman Empire adopted a somewhat caesaropapist tendency in its approach to Christians and Jews within its borders. During the French Revolution in the late 1700s, the government attempted to promote and regulate first "the cult of Reason" and later "the cult of the Supreme Being," neither of which caught on. In the primarily Orthodox parts of Europe and the Middle East, Christian caesaropapism existed in basically an unbroken line of continuity from Constantine to Tsar Nicholas II Except for Rome, the patriarchates, old and new, have tended to be national in scope and feeling, each closely identified with its people and, until recent decades, with the government. But when the Orthodox are accused of caesaropapism, subjection of Church to state, they remind us that early councils were convened by the emperor, and that the bishop of Rome allied himself with the emperor more than once to defeat a rival patriarch. (The same religion for ruler and people was the rule in Western lands until quite recent times.(Nelson, 62, 1995).

But in Russia caesaropapist ideas were taken from Byzantine Empire toward the end of the tenth century, the Orthodox Church had developed the doctrine of *caesaropapism*, whereby the emperor was the absolute ruler of the state and the head of the church. Consequently, all powers, ecclesiastical and temporal, were vested in the emperor alone. This doctrine was adopted in Russia in the fifteenth century, when the tsars

declared themselves the successors of the Byzantine emperors (Keefe, 443, 1971). Supremacy of state over church at in the Byzantine Empire, and in Russia till 1917 is generally considered to be the converse of ecclesiastical hegemony over states (Ferm, 113, 1959).

The illusion of the XX centuries was that politics had taken the central stage of moral life, thus giving birth of the "political theodicy", understood as the transferring of the debates of rational theology unto the pragmatic field of politics. According to Dan Pavel, "political theodicy" defined the efforts of the Bolshevik political engineers to substitute God by converting theological discourse without leaving the sphere of religion (Pavel, 19, 998). The pad ox was that while the Russian Orthodox Church was integral to tsarism, the Bolsheviks were militant atheists, although not without a surrogate religiosity of their own. Combined, the Jacobins and Bolshevik ideologies used the medieval type of clericalism to motivate their political cynicism with the thesis of the nationalist state as a "system", and the church as a "subsystem", dispensable, and controlled by strict laws. From Byzantium came not only Christianity, but the political philosophy of the divine right of the Prince—a concept in total contradiction to that of the *Vieche* institution, which elected executive authority and delegated power to it.

Altogether, the authority delegated to the Grand Prince by the Mongol Khan, the Caesaropapism of Byzantium, and the inherent weakness of the *Vieche* itself, were the three main causes undermining the democratic principalities such as Novgorod and Pskov. The political center of gravity thus shifted to Moscow, where the Grand Prince and later Tsar ruled (Gregory, 52, 1951).

Most of Orthodox Europe after World War II came under communist control, and while the old state churches were persecuted, they were occasionally used for political purposes (Josif Visarjunovic Staljin used the Russian Orthodox Church as a nationalist rallying point after the German invasion of the USSR in 1941) and allowed to operate so long as they followed government dictates (specifically not speaking against the actions of the government and not contradicting official government accounts).

The reversal of the New Economic Policy in 1928 was followed by the nationalization of all industry and the collectivization of the farmers. The succeeding years were years of terror and suffering for the majority of the population. Through total planning the so-called private sector of the national economy was merged with the sector of state economy. The protection of public property became a major goal; for this purpose penal legislation was strengthened (Keefe, 451, 1971).

This is a kind of domination in the most important state issues. After the Second World War its rest only domination in the religious field. In Russia, the religion after the Second World War was not completely anated by the government even the state had officially atheist position. Religion was under the strict control of the state where Stalin is now on top of her, and every decision depended on it. This is a new kind of caesaropism.

In the People's Republic of China (PRC), an extremely multi-faceted approach to caesaropapism is in effect. While the government maintains an officially atheist position, the PRC is at least now pragmatic enough to understand that religion cannot

be completely erased from so large a country, so all religions fall under the rubric of the State Administration for Religious Affairs.

The PRC recognizes Buddhism, Taoism, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam as officially permissible to practice, but also says that no religious exercise can threaten the cohesiveness of the state or national, which can mean any number of things there. China has made it known that when the current Dalai Lama dies, they will have the final say into whose form he has been reincarnated. How the government of China intends to influence an abstract metaphysical phenomenon like the transmigration of a soul into a new body is unknown. In the late 1950s, the Chinese government created the Patriotic Catholic Association with the goal of making it the only officially organized Catholic Church in the country. Legally, the PCA is the only body permitted to consecrate bishops and priests in China and any Catholic practice outside of the PCA is against the law (note that the vast majority of Catholics in China are not members of the PCA). Pope Pius XII declared this organization not in communion with the Vatican and excommunicated all clergy associated with it.

Conclusions

The clash of the two powers in medieval Europe and in the Islam resulted in the greatest differences between the cultural development of the Orient and Occident. The extreme opposite of any kind of hierocracy, caesaropapism- the complete subordination of priestly to secular power, can nowhere never be found in its pure type. In the case of Constantine the great as Henry Byng says: "In the case of a man of genius, whose ambition and love of power refuse to him a moment's peace, there can be no question of Christianity or paganism, of conscious religion or irreligion. Such a man, even when he persuades himself that he has his place. After him till today this conclusion have the meaning, leaders of various governments when it comes to the power lose the reason as Constantin the great lose with his famous caesaropapism. Caesaropapist powers are wielded not only by the Chinese, Russian, Turkish and Persian ruler but also by the English and German ruler, who is the head of the church (*summus episcopus*) yet this powers are everywhere limited by *autonomus ecclesiastic charisma*. The byzantine basileus like the pharaoh, Indian and Chinese monarchs and also the Protestant *summi episcopi*, attempted repeatedly, mostly without success, to impose religious beliefs and norms of their own making. Such attempts were always extremely dangerous for them. In general, the subjugation of religious to royal authority was most successful when religious qualification still functioned as a magical charisma of its bearers and had not yet been rationalized into a bureaucratic apparatus with its own doctrinal system- two usually related phenomena; subjugation was feasible especially when ethics or salvation were not yet dominant in religious thought or had been abandoned again. But wherever they prevail, hierocracy is often invincible, and secular authority must compromise with it. By contrast magic-ritual forces were controlled most thoroughly in the ancient polis, rather well by the feudal powers in Japan and the patrimonial ones in China, and at least reasonably well by bureaucratic state in Byzantium and Russia. But wherever religious charisma developed a doctrinal system and an organizational apparatus, the caesaropapist

state, too, contained a strong hierocratic admixture.

The fate of the orthodox countries of the Europe of the XIX and XX centuries, prisoners to extremist ideologies sweeping across cultures, was to encounter a form of nationalist state where control of the churches was maintained for political ends. Even in the nineteenth century and the twentieth century, especially in the Balkans we have been present nationalist platform created by binomial State -church, as is the case with Serbian *Načrtanija*.

For the same purposes Constantine through his caesaropapism used the religion for political ends. He was very good player and till the end of his life he was pagan one converting in the death bed. So this model was reused as we see even in today's political ideologies. The problem with this nationalist form of church submission was that, by absolutizing the political ends, it involved a rejection of the transcendence of God. When the state itself is regarded to be the highest good, two major changes take place: the state becomes God, and the integrity of the church along with other religious institutions is undermined. The loss of church integrity during Communism was generated by this combination of nationalism and caesaropapism that would gain prominence in Marxist- Communist countries. Today if we want it to have functional state, functional religion and democratic society its necessary to be separate religion from the state, like this caesaropapism will be just a historical past and peoples going to live in harmony and Peaceful logic would be queen of the world.

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